數學與金融經典教材（影印版）·激勵理論：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] pdf epub mobi txt 電子書 下載 2025

簡體網頁||繁體網頁

☆☆☆☆☆

[美] 拉奉特（Laffont J.J.） 著

齣版社： 世界圖書齣版公司

ISBN：9787510050503

版次：1

商品編碼：11154485

包裝：平裝

外文名稱：The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model

開本：16開

齣版時間：2013-01-01

用紙：膠版紙

頁數：421

正文語種：英文

內容簡介

　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.

內頁插圖

目錄

Foreword
Introduction
1 Incentives in Economic'Thought
1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Croves: The Free-Rider Problem
1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
1.5 L60n Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives
1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
1.9 Incentives in Plaiined Economies
1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
1.11 Auctions

2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.1 The Basic Model
2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
2.4 Information Rents
2.5 The Optunization Program of the PrincipaJ
2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
2.9 The Revelation Principle
2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent
2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
2.12 Commitment
2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms
2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
2.15 Contract Theory at Work
Appendix

3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection
3.1 More than Two Types
3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and
Countervailing Incentives
3.4 Random Participation Constraint
3.5 Limited Liability
3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off
Appendices

4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
4.1 The Model
4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
……
5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard
6 Nonverifiability
7 Mixed Models
8 Dynamics under Full Commitment
9 Limits and Extensions

Re ferences
Author Index
Subject Index

前言/序言

　　The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance iii eco- nomics in the last thirty years. The objective of this book is to provide easy access to this theory for undergraduate and first-year graduate smdents in economics. Our goal is not to be as complete as possible in covering and surveying the many contributions that have fiourished in the realm of incentive theory. Instead， our contribution is methodological and intended to offer students some iiiitial clues for analyzing the issues raised by this theory. As much as possible we have favored the simplest models to explain the core of the theory. The exposition has been divided into three books for methodological clarity. This volume presents the basic principal-agent theory with complete contracts. It allows a first exposition of the transaction costs created by contracting under asymmetric information without having to appeal to sophisticated game theory concepts.
　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.
　　Going through the text and.checking the proofs should provide a good way for stu-dents to appropriate the material. Throughout the book we have listed under the heading the major references that are useful to pursue the study of incentive theory.
　　……

評分☆☆☆☆☆

委托書授權不明的，被代理人應當嚮第三人承擔民事責任，代理人負連帶責任。

評分☆☆☆☆☆

感覺還不錯，贊一個感覺還不錯，贊一個

評分☆☆☆☆☆

題的分析和政策的製定提供瞭一個最為權威的理論依據.

評分☆☆☆☆☆

委托代理關係起源於“專業化”的存在。當存在“專業化”時就可能齣現一種關係，在這種關係中，代理人由於相對優勢而代錶委托人行動。現代意義的委托代理的概念最早是由羅斯提齣的:“如果當事人雙方，其中代理人一方代錶委托人一方的利益行使某些決策權，則代理關係就隨之産生。”委托代理理論從不同於傳統微觀經濟學的角度來分析企業內部、企業之間的委托代理關係，它在解釋一些組織現象時，優於一般的微觀經濟學。

評分☆☆☆☆☆

評分☆☆☆☆☆

建立基礎

評分☆☆☆☆☆

1975年,拉豐教授放棄瞭在美國一流大學任教的機會,毅然迴到法國開始瞭他艱難的振興法國經濟學的曆程.由於在巴黎法國理工學院推行經濟學改革遭遇的阻力太大,他隻身迴到傢鄉圖盧茲,在圖盧茲大學任教並傳播主流經濟學,同時不懈地開創經濟學的新領域.經過十幾年孤獨而又艱苦的創業,1990年,法國産業經濟研究所（IDEI）宣布成立,拉豐教授任IDEI主任.在他的愛國熱情的感召下,包括讓·梯若爾在內的一批在國際上享有盛譽的法國經濟學傢都來到使它的學術水平和教育質量獲得瞭空前的提高.如今的IDEI已經成為經濟學界公認的世界第一的産業經濟學研究中心.拉豐教授傳播經濟學的熱情並不局限在法國,他尤其關注發展中國傢發展過程中製度變革所帶來的激勵問題.a他認為發展中國傢製度變革的選擇最終決定瞭該國的發展道路,而要順利地完成一個閤理、有效的製度變遷,必須要有一批真正的經濟學傢參與這一過程.為此,他不遺餘力地為發展中國傢培養年輕的經濟學者,並要求他們學成後迴國積極投身經濟製度改革.同時他不辭辛勞地到中國、拉美、非洲等地講學,傳播經濟學思想,並積極參與發展中國傢産業規製政策的實證研究.拉豐教授傳播經濟學思想的熱情和對經濟學理論所作的巨大貢獻使他贏得瞭極高的國際聲譽.

評分☆☆☆☆☆

委托代理理論的主要觀點認為：委托代理關係是隨著生産力大發展和規模化大生産的齣現而産生的。其原因一方麵是生産力發展使得分工進一步細化，權利的所有者由於知識、能力和精力的原因不能行使所有的權利瞭；另一方麵專業化分工産生瞭一大批具有專業知識的代理人，他們有精力、有能力代理行使好被委托的權利。但在委托代理的關係當中，由於委托人與代理人的效用函數不一樣，委托人追求的是自己的財富更大，而代理人追求自己的工資津貼收入、奢侈消費和閑暇時間最大化，這必然導緻兩者的利益衝突。在沒有有效的製度安排下代理人的行為很可能最終損害委托人的利益。而世界——不管是經濟領域還是社會領域——都普遍存在委托代理關係。

評分☆☆☆☆☆