數學與金融經典教材（影印版）·激勵理論：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] 下載 mobi epub pdf 電子書 2025

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內容簡介

　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.

內頁插圖

目錄

Foreword
Introduction
1 Incentives in Economic'Thought
1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Croves: The Free-Rider Problem
1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
1.5 L60n Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives
1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
1.9 Incentives in Plaiined Economies
1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
1.11 Auctions

2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.1 The Basic Model
2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
2.4 Information Rents
2.5 The Optunization Program of the PrincipaJ
2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
2.9 The Revelation Principle
2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent
2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
2.12 Commitment
2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms
2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
2.15 Contract Theory at Work
Appendix

3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection
3.1 More than Two Types
3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and
Countervailing Incentives
3.4 Random Participation Constraint
3.5 Limited Liability
3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off
Appendices

4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
4.1 The Model
4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
……
5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard
6 Nonverifiability
7 Mixed Models
8 Dynamics under Full Commitment
9 Limits and Extensions

Re ferences
Author Index
Subject Index

前言/序言

　　The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance iii eco- nomics in the last thirty years. The objective of this book is to provide easy access to this theory for undergraduate and first-year graduate smdents in economics. Our goal is not to be as complete as possible in covering and surveying the many contributions that have fiourished in the realm of incentive theory. Instead， our contribution is methodological and intended to offer students some iiiitial clues for analyzing the issues raised by this theory. As much as possible we have favored the simplest models to explain the core of the theory. The exposition has been divided into three books for methodological clarity. This volume presents the basic principal-agent theory with complete contracts. It allows a first exposition of the transaction costs created by contracting under asymmetric information without having to appeal to sophisticated game theory concepts.
　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.
　　Going through the text and.checking the proofs should provide a good way for stu-dents to appropriate the material. Throughout the book we have listed under the heading the major references that are useful to pursue the study of incentive theory.
　　……

數學與金融經典教材（影印版）·激勵理論：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] 下載 mobi epub pdf txt 電子書 格式

評分☆☆☆☆☆

與許多理論經濟學傢不同的是,拉豐教授非常重視經濟學理論的應用與檢驗.從80年代中期開始,他和梯若爾就努力將新規製經濟學的基本思想和方法應用於諸如電信、電力、天然氣、交通運輸等壟斷行業的規製問題,分析各種規製政策的激勵效應,並建立瞭一個規範的評價體係.拉豐教授積極參與並領導瞭法國電信改革的實證研究工作.2000年,作為對十幾年壟斷行業規製理論與政策研究的總結,《電信競爭》一書（與梯若爾閤著）為電信及網絡産業的競爭與規製問

評分☆☆☆☆☆

委托代理人為被代理人的利益需要轉托他人代理的，應當事先取得被代理人的同意。事先沒有取得被代理人同意的，應當在事後及時告訴被代理人，如果被代理人不同意，由代理人對自己所轉托的人的行為負民事責任，但在緊急情況下，為瞭保護被代理人的利益而轉托他人代理的除外。

評分☆☆☆☆☆

委托代理理論是過去30多年裏契約理論最重要的發展之一。它是20世紀60年代末70年代初一些經濟學傢深入研究企業內部信息不對稱和激勵問題發展起來的。委托代理理論的中心任務是研究在利益相衝突和信息不對稱的環境下，委托人如何設計最優契約激勵代理人。

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評分☆☆☆☆☆

委托代理理論（Principal-agent Theory）上世紀30年代，美國經濟學傢伯利和米恩斯因為洞悉企業所有者兼具經營者的做法存在著極大的弊端，於是提齣“委托代理理論”，倡導所有權和經營權分離，企業所有者保留剩餘索取權，而將經營權利讓渡。“委托代理理論”早已成為現代公司治理的邏輯起點。

評分☆☆☆☆☆

早期的激勵理論研究是對於“需要”的研究，迴答瞭以什麼為基礎、或根據什麼纔能激發調動起員工工作積極性的問題，包括馬斯洛的需求層次理論、赫茨伯格的雙因素理論，和麥剋利蘭的成就需要理論等。最具代錶性的馬斯洛需要層次論就提齣人類的需要是有等級層次的，從最低級的需要逐級嚮最高級的需要發展。需要按其重要性依次排列為：生理需要、安全需要、歸屬與愛的需要、尊重需要和自我實現需要。並且提齣當某一級的需要獲得滿足以後，這種需要便中止瞭它的激勵作用。

評分☆☆☆☆☆

讀者對象：數學、經濟相關專業的本科生、研究生和相關經濟領域的從業人員。

評分☆☆☆☆☆

沒的說，但是就目前水平來說也就是一天幾頁的速度，加上量化的應用會更考驗英文閱讀能力

評分☆☆☆☆☆

指人對實現該目標有多大價值的主觀判斷。如果實現該目標對人來說，很有價值，人的積極性就高；反之，積極性則低。

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