数学与金融经典教材（影印版）·激励理论：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] pdf epub mobi txt 电子书 下载 2025

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[美] 拉奉特（Laffont J.J.） 著

出版社： 世界图书出版公司

ISBN：9787510050503

版次：1

商品编码：11154485

包装：平装

外文名称：The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model

开本：16开

出版时间：2013-01-01

用纸：胶版纸

页数：421

正文语种：英文

内容简介

　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.

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目录

Foreword
Introduction
1 Incentives in Economic'Thought
1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Croves: The Free-Rider Problem
1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
1.5 L60n Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives
1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
1.9 Incentives in Plaiined Economies
1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
1.11 Auctions

2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.1 The Basic Model
2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
2.4 Information Rents
2.5 The Optunization Program of the PrincipaJ
2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
2.9 The Revelation Principle
2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent
2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
2.12 Commitment
2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms
2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
2.15 Contract Theory at Work
Appendix

3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection
3.1 More than Two Types
3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and
Countervailing Incentives
3.4 Random Participation Constraint
3.5 Limited Liability
3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off
Appendices

4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
4.1 The Model
4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
……
5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard
6 Nonverifiability
7 Mixed Models
8 Dynamics under Full Commitment
9 Limits and Extensions

Re ferences
Author Index
Subject Index

前言/序言

　　The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance iii eco- nomics in the last thirty years. The objective of this book is to provide easy access to this theory for undergraduate and first-year graduate smdents in economics. Our goal is not to be as complete as possible in covering and surveying the many contributions that have fiourished in the realm of incentive theory. Instead， our contribution is methodological and intended to offer students some iiiitial clues for analyzing the issues raised by this theory. As much as possible we have favored the simplest models to explain the core of the theory. The exposition has been divided into three books for methodological clarity. This volume presents the basic principal-agent theory with complete contracts. It allows a first exposition of the transaction costs created by contracting under asymmetric information without having to appeal to sophisticated game theory concepts.
　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.
　　Going through the text and.checking the proofs should provide a good way for stu-dents to appropriate the material. Throughout the book we have listed under the heading the major references that are useful to pursue the study of incentive theory.
　　……

评分☆☆☆☆☆

编辑本段定义

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委托代理理论是过去30多年里契约理论最重要的发展之一。它是20世纪60年代末70年代初一些经济学家深入研究企业内部信息不对称和激励问题发展起来的。委托代理理论的中心任务是研究在利益相冲突和信息不对称的环境下，委托人如何设计最优契约激励代理人。

评分☆☆☆☆☆

。。。。。。。。。。。。

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指人对实现该目标可能性大小的主观估计。只有人认为实现该目标的可能性很大，才会去努力争取实现，从而在较高程度上发挥目标的激励作用；如果人认为实现该目标的可能性很小，甚至完全没有可能，目标激励作用则小，以至完全没有。

评分☆☆☆☆☆

内容简介近四十年来经济学最重要的发展在于激励领域，它研究了不对称信息下当事人如何获得的潜在的互利收益的激励问题。现在是将这一领域集成并系统化的时候了。让-雅克•拉丰是这一领域最重要的贡献者之一，而大卫•马赫蒂摩也显示了他的理论功底。本书从这一领域最基本的模型出发，完整而清晰地概括了这一领域的发展历程。 目录序 导言 第一章 经济思想中的激励问题 第二章 租金抽取与配置效率的权衡 第三章 逆向选择的激励与参与约束 第四章 道德风险：基本的权衡 第五章 道德风险下的激励和参与约束 第六章 不可验证性 第七章 混合模型 第八章 完全承诺下的动态模型 第九章 局限性与扩展

评分☆☆☆☆☆

委托代理人为被代理人的利益需要转托他人代理的，应当事先取得被代理人的同意。事先没有取得被代理人同意的，应当在事后及时告诉被代理人，如果被代理人不同意，由代理人对自己所转托的人的行为负民事责任，但在紧急情况下，为了保护被代理人的利益而转托他人代理的除外。

评分☆☆☆☆☆

还是比较经典的书，值得读一读

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信息经济学经典

评分☆☆☆☆☆

内容简介近四十年来经济学最重要的发展在于激励领域，它研究了不对称信息下当事人如何获得的潜在的互利收益的激励问题。现在是将这一领域集成并系统化的时候了。让-雅克•拉丰是这一领域最重要的贡献者之一，而大卫•马赫蒂摩也显示了他的理论功底。本书从这一领域最基本的模型出发，完整而清晰地概括了这一领域的发展历程。 目录序 导言 第一章 经济思想中的激励问题 第二章 租金抽取与配置效率的权衡 第三章 逆向选择的激励与参与约束 第四章 道德风险：基本的权衡 第五章 道德风险下的激励和参与约束 第六章 不可验证性 第七章 混合模型 第八章 完全承诺下的动态模型 第九章 局限性与扩展